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ABSTRACT 
 
If reports in the popular press are to be believed, even though the great recession of 2008 ended in 
2009, U.S. corporate capital expenditures did not rebound.  Lack of capital investment due to 
widespread cash hoarding is cited as a reason for the slow economic recovery.  This study does 
not find evidence that S&P 500 firms have slowed their rate of capital expenditures.  On the 
contrary, capital intensive industries, such as materials, energy, and industrials show significant 
growth in capital expenditures in 2010 and 2011. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
he shareholder wealth maximization objective requires that managers commit capital to only those 
projects that meet or exceed the firm’s cost of capital.  In efficient markets, the stock prices of 
companies announcing new capital outlays should reflect the positive/negative net present values of 
the outlays based on the investors’ preliminary information on the outlays. McConnell and Muscarella (1985) report 
stock price increases for industrial firms announcing unexpected increases in capital expenditures, but not for 
utilities.  Chung, Wright, and Charoenwong (1998) find similar evidence for companies with valuable investment 
opportunities.  There is evidence that corporate capital investments by a firm even affect the stock prices of its 
competitors.  Chen, Ho, and Shih (2007) find that rivals' share prices are more adversely affected when the investing 
firm experiences a higher announcement effect or is the first mover in the industry.  Given those scenarios, the 
investment actions of firms given the recent economic downturn are of interest to many.   
 
 Press reports indicate that corporate capital expenditures are growing at an anemic rate and that U.S. firms 
are hoarding cash, resulting in a higher than normal unemployment rate 
(http://www.standardandpoors.com/ratings/articles/en/us/?articleType=HTML&assetID=1245344777224).  For 
instance, USA Today (2013) reports Google is hoarding some $48 billion.  Similarly, Apple has some $137 billion 
in cash on its balance sheet (Swisher, 2013).  Why are U.S. firms not investing if such investments, on average, are 
viewed positively by shareholders?  There may be several explanations for the anemic corporate capital expenditures 
if the press reports are true.  First, U.S. firms are unable to find positive NPV projects.  This could be due to the 
excess capacity in the economy or, in certain industries, a slowdown in technological advances, and/or a low 
aggregate demand, in general, due to a severe shrinkage in wealth.  Second, firms may face capital rationing.  
Lenders have become more cautious and are unwilling to lend on the more lax terms prevalent in the pre-2008 
period.  Further, as many have argued before, managers may be short-sighted and look for projects with a quick 
return.  They have no patience for long-term projects that will dampen the company’s results in the near future.  
Finally, it is possible that geo-political uncertainties complicate the managers’ capital budgeting task.  Fiscal cliff, 
looming currency wars, and global economic uncertainty make it difficult for managers to estimate either the cost of 
capital or the project’s cash flows, resulting in lower capital expenditures. 
 
 On the other hand, just because some firms have large cash positions on their balance sheets, such positions 
don’t translate directly into a non-investment strategy.  Cash, besides its use to pay short-term obligations, offers 
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firms the opportunity to make investments that may require substantial sums. In addition, there are myriad reasons 
for holding cash, including the desire to avoid US taxes by bringing the funds in from overseas activities. 
 
 This study attempts to answer two important research questions:  1) have corporate capital expenditures 
been growing at below “normal” rates in the post-recession period? And 2) if corporations have indeed not been 
investing, then what are corporations doing with the excess cash? Corporations may hoard cash, increase dividends, 
and/or buy back their stock if they are not investing. 
 
SAMPLE, DATA, AND STUDY DESIGN 
 
 The study sample comprises all S&P 500 firms, excluding the financials.  Data on the 419 non-financial 
sample firms were gathered from Bloomberg Financial Services. 
 
 In order to determine the benchmark for the capital expenditure growth rate for each of the nine S&P 500 
industries, it is hypothesized that the capital expenditure growth rate is a function of the prior three years’ sales 
growth rate.  A number of prior studies have found corporate investments to be affected by CEO overconfidence 
(Malmendier and Tate, 2005) or by the firm’s stock price (Polk and Sapienza, 2009).  This study tried a number of 
variables to explain the capital expenditure growth rate, but the prior three-year sales growth rate appears to have the 
greatest explanatory power.   
 
 The 1998-2001 period is selected as the model estimation period in order to include the effect of a 
recession on corporate capital expenditures, as the U.S. economy experienced a recession in 2000.  Using the panel 
data for each industry, a model is developed by regressing each firm’s current year’s capital expenditure growth rate 
on the previous three years’ sales growth rate.  Beginning in 2010, using the prior three years’ sales growth rate for 
each firm, the industry model is used to predict the 2010 capital expenditure growth rate.  The actual growth rate 
minus the predicted growth rate is defined as the abnormal growth rate.  The abnormal capital expenditure growth 
rate is also estimated for 2011.  Statistical tests are performed to determine if the corporate capital expenditures have 
grown at expected rates in the post-recession period. 
 
FINDINGS 
 
 Table 1 contains regression parameters from regressing each firm’s capital expenditure growth rate on the 
prior three years’ sales growth rate during the period 1998-2001. 
 
Table 1:  Regression Parameters 
Industry Intercept Coefficient F-Statistic (Probability) 
Energy 3.162882 
 
0.732648 
 
18.35292 
(0.00) 
Materials -6.21883 
 
0.863539 
 
8.40845 
(0.00) 
Industrials -6.94878 
 
0.807115 
 
48.55623 
(0.00) 
Consumer Discretionary -10.6168 
 
1.781438 
 
126.1542 
(0.00) 
Consumer Staples 4.048261 
 
0.692739 
 
9.066095 
(0.00) 
Healthcare 11.31842 
 
0.533337 
 
38.31772 
(0.00) 
Information Technology -1.44714 
 
1.039542 
 
58.50475 
(0.00) 
Telecommunications -1.80658 
 
0.281968 
 
0.939688 
(0.34) 
Utilities 16.82988 
 
0.68671 
 
3.603636 
(0.06) 
Table Note: The OLS parameter estimates by industry were obtained from regressing a firm’s capital expenditure growth rate on 
the preceding three-year sales growth rate. The sample includes all S&P 500 firms, excluding the financial firms.  The parameters 
were estimated using data from 1998 to 2001. 
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 The parameters are estimated for each industry to prevent industry-specific effects from diminishing the 
power of the statistical tests.  As Table 1 indicates, the F statistic for the hypothesized relationship is highly 
significant in all but two industries - telecommunications and utilities. 
 
 In the next step, each firm’s capital sales growth rate in 2010 (and 2011) is used in the industry model 
estimated in the previous step to predict the firm’s capital expenditure growth rate.  The predicted growth rate is 
subtracted from the actual rate to estimate the abnormal rate.  t-Tests are performed to test the significance of the 
abnormal rates.  Table 2 contains the findings. 
 
Table 2:  Excess Capital Expenditure Growth Rate By Industry For 2010 And 2011 
Industry Actual Predicted Capital Expenditure 
Growth Rate 2011 (Probability) 
Actual Predicted Capital Expenditure 
Growth Rate 2010 (Probability) 
Energy 35.41705484 
(0.00) 
11.40536 
(0.07) 
Materials 48.58270295 
(0.00) 
11.2422 
(0.08) 
Industrials 35.26429614 
(0.00) 
20.70216 
(0.00) 
Consumer Discretionary 28.69722473 
(0.00) 
28.85571 
(0.00) 
Consumer Staples 6.946091361 
(.10) 
1.686856 
(0.64) 
Healthcare 6.069497623 
(0.17) 
16.61512 
(0.00) 
Information Technology 11.18200809 
(0.07) 
8.974496 
(0.33) 
Telecommunications 49.50183322 
(0.03) 
27.79019 
(0.10) 
Utilities 6.51725198 
(0.43) 
-17.8205 
(0.00) 
The excess growth rate is defined as the actual rate minus the rate predicted by the model. 
 
 As column 3 of Table 2 indicates, “utilities” is the only industry that significantly reduced its capital 
expenditures in 2010.  All remaining industries either display a significant increase in the capital structure growth 
rates or normal growth rates.  In particular, healthcare, industrials, and consumer discretionary industries show 
highly significant and positive capital expenditure growth rates.  In 2011, in addition to the industrials and consumer 
discretionary industries, energy, telecommunications and materials industries grew their expenditures significantly. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Journal of Business & Economics Research – August 2013   Volume 11, Number 8 
342 Copyright by author(s) Creative Commons License CC-BY 2013 The Clute Institute 
 The above evidence does not support the view that U.S. firms have not been investing at the expected 
levels.  The study also statistically compares the mean values of capital expenditures, cash, common equity, and 
dividend payments in the pre-recession period (2005-2006) and the post-recession period (2010-2011).  As Table 3 
indicates, while energy and utilities significantly raised their capital expenditures, no significant changes are 
detected for the remaining industries.   
 
Table 3:  Changes In The Mean Values Of Capital Expenditure, Cash Balances, Par And Additional Paid In Capital, And 
Dividend Payments In The Pre-Recession (2005-2006) And Post- Recession (2010-2011) Periods 
Industry Capital Expenditure Cash Equity Dividend Payments 
Energy 1526.4565 
(0.00) 
247.3443 
(0.64) 
1635.0574 
(0.00) 
-220.744 
(0.00) 
Materials 158.34308 
(0.10) 
753.1439 
(0.00) 
1127.2166 
(0.06) 
-33.2261 
(0.34) 
Industrials -1.92721989 
(0.80) 
1762.358 
(0.15) 
543.08201 
(0.05) 
-34.9858 
(0.66) 
Consumer 
Discretionary 
-55.6409232 
(0.53) 
211.3912 
(0.34) 
-4.535726 
(0.99) 
-44.963 
(0.39) 
Consumer Staples 33.376902 
(0.71) 
430.8005 
(0.06) 
1154.0363 
(0.01) 
-239.263 
(0.07) 
Healthcare 20.70647 
(0.43) 
1055.838 
(0.00) 
1362.5167 
(0.08) 
-167.658 
(0.00) 
Information 
Technology 
204.70892 
(0.05) 
1021.621 
(0.00) 
1447.3795 
(0.00) 
-126.478 
(0.06) 
Telecommunications 1681.7486 
(0.43) 
1316.224 
(0.29) 
8319.0811 
(0.11) 
-1077.58 
(0.25) 
Utilities 648.64268 
(0.00) 
160.7944 
(0.09) 
930.01309 
(0.00) 
-96.6327 
(0.00) 
Probability values associated with the changes are provided in parentheses. 
  
 Materials, healthcare and information technologies raised their cash levels significantly while a number of 
industries, including materials, information technology, consumer staples, energy and utilities, raised new equity to 
beef up their balance sheets.  Finally, dividend payments were reduced in all industries to conserve cash and/or to 
provide for capital expenditures.   
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 Press reports indicate that U.S. firms have been holding back on capital expenditures and are responsible 
for the slow economic recovery and a high unemployment rate.  Taking a sample of non-financial S&P 500 firms 
and using regression analyses and mean tests, this study does not find evidence that U.S. firms have slowed down 
the capital expenditure growth rate.  Evidence suggests that from 2005 to 2006 and 2010 to 2011, U.S. firms reduced 
their dividend payments, raised funds through new equity, and conserved cash while maintaining/increasing capital 
expenditures, in general. 
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